On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Hausken, Kjell |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 3, p. 504-507
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Rent seeking | Production | Conflict | Two efforts |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; L - Industrial Organization |
Source: |
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