On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.

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Year of publication:	2004-05
Authors:	Peleg, Bezalel ; Sudholter, Peter
Institutions:	Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Subject:	NTU games \| Mas-Colell bargaining set

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, vol. 41, pp. 1060-1068. 10 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752799