On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
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Authors: | Allouch, Nizar ; Wooders, Myrna Holtz |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 63.2017, 1, p. 191-209
|
Subject: | NTU games | Core | Approximate cores | Small group effectiveness | Coalition formation | Payoff-dependent balancedness | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility |
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