On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option
We examine whether nations, faced with the threat of terrorism, will be motivated to engage in the efficient amount of retaliation against terrorists. We demonstrate that the problem confronting the efforts of nations to achieve an optimal retaliation against terrorists is understated by the traditional free-rider analysis. In particular, nations have the option of actually selling or reducing the public good of retaliation, provided through the efforts of others, by offering safe havens to terrorists in return for the terrorists' pledge to attack elsewhere. This paid-rider behavior is also shown to apply to other public good scenarios. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lee, Dwight ; Sandler, Todd |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 61.1989, 2, p. 141-152
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Sandler, Todd,
-
Hartley, Keith,
-
Defense in a Globalized World: An Introduction
Sandler, Todd,
- More ...