On the optimal sanction structure when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Friehe, Tim |
Published in: |
The shadow economy, corruption and governance. - Cheltenham [u.a.] : Elgar, ISBN 1-84844-079-0. - 2008, p. 63-76
|
Subject: | Institutionelle Infrastruktur | Institutional infrastructure | Schattenwirtschaft | Underground economy | Korruption | Corruption | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Strafe | Punishment | Theorie | Theory |
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