On the optimality of not allocating
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hernando-Veciana, Ángel ; Michelucci, Fabio |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 125.2014, 2, p. 233-235
|
Subject: | Efficiency | Auctions | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie |
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