On the Optimality of Not Allocating
Year of publication: |
2014-07
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hernando-Veciana, Angel ; Michelucci, Fabio |
Institutions: | Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) |
Subject: | efficiency | auctions | mechanism design |
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