On the private provision of contentious public characteristics

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Cornes, Richard ; Rübbelke, Dirk
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Öffentliches Gut \| Allokation \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| public goods \| public bads \| aggregative games

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 3881
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	720709660 [GVK] hdl:10419/61023 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283603