On the Relationship Between Incentives and Performance

This paper seeks to explore how an agent's incentives to perform influences her performance. We analyze this question in a simple principal-agent model, where the agent chooses how much effort to invest and which project to implement. We show that the relationship between the incentives to perform and the expected performance could be negative. The paper thus offers a novel, non-behavioral explanation for the failure of incentives

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Weinschenk, Philipp
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Unternehmenserfolg \| Firm performance \| Theorie \| Theory \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (27 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 7, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3434060 [DOI]
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865018