On the Sensitivity of Von Neuman and Moregenstern Abstract Stable Sets:The Stable and the Individual Stable Bargaining Set.
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Greenberg, J. |
Institutions: | CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg |
Subject: | econometrics | game theory | economic models |
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