On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

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Year of publication:	1999-06
Authors:	Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen ; Jensen, Mogens ; Sloth, Brigitte
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Subject:	Evolutionary learning \| coordination games \| equilibrium selection

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772597