On the structure of unemployment benefits in shirking models
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Goerke, Laszlo |
Published in: |
Labour economics : official journal of the European Association of Labour Economists. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0927-5371, ZDB-ID 1167233-X. - Vol. 7.2000, 3, p. 283-295
|
Subject: | Effizienzlohn | Efficiency wages | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Theorie | Theory |
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