On the testable implications of collective choice theories
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Sprumont, Yves |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 93.2000, 2, p. 205-232
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Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Offenbarte Präferenzen | Revealed preferences | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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