On the use of a modified Shapley value to determine the optimal size of a cartel
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Rothschild, R. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 45.2001, 1, p. 37-47
|
Subject: | Koalition | Coalition | Kartell | Cartel | Theorie | Theory | Shapley-Wert | Shapley value |
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