On the use of information in repeated insurance markets

Iris Kesternich; Heiner Schumacher

We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of "unused observables" that is information which

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Kesternich, Iris ; Schumacher, Heiner
Publisher:	Mannheim [u. a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	repeated games \| insurance markets \| oligopoly \| unused observables \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Versicherungsmarkt \| Insurance market \| Theorie \| Theory \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (19 S.)
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 280
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/94102 [Handle]
Classification:	G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909273