On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Sousa, José de ; Fairise, Xavier |
Published in: |
Journal of economics. - Wien [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0931-8658, ZDB-ID 635037-9. - Vol. 111.2014, 2, p. 151-171
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Subject: | Incomplete contracts | Relationship-specific investments | Cooperation | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Investition | Investment | Unternehmenskooperation | Inter-firm cooperation | Kooperation | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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