On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gigler, Frank ; Hemmer, Thomas |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 37.2008, 2, p. 243-265
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Principal–agent problem | Limited versus unlimited renegotiations | Value of limiting commitment |
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