One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals as the generalized fixed point of the decumulative distribution of the players' ideal points as induced by the recognition probabilities. In contrast to the existing literature, we find no general relationship between the limit equilibrium proposals and either the Nash bargaining solution or the median voter outcome.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Predtetchinski, Arkadi |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 145.2010, 1, p. 189-215
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | One-dimensional bargaining Markov process Median voter theorem Nash bargaining solution |
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