One-Leader and Multiple-Follower Stackelberg Games with Private Information

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Nakamura, Tomoya
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Duopol \| Duopoly

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (13 p)
Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 908
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 29, 2014 erstellt
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014143911