One Share - One Vote: the Theory
The theoretical literature on security-voting structure can be organized around three questions: What impact do nonvoting shares have on takeover outcomes? How does disproportional voting power affect the incentives of blockholders? What are the repercussions of mandating one share - one vote for firms' financing and ownership choices? Overall, the costs and benefits of separating cash flow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade off between disempowering blockholders and empowering managers. It is therefore an open question whether mandating one share - one vote would improve the quality of corporate governance, notably in systems that so far relied on active owners. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Burkart, Mike ; Lee, Samuel |
Published in: |
Review of Finance. - European Finance Association - EFA, ISSN 1572-3097. - Vol. 12.2008, 1, p. 1-49
|
Publisher: |
European Finance Association - EFA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Security-voting structure and bidder screening
At, Christian, (2007)
-
Security-voting structure and bidder screening
At, Christian, (2007)
-
One share - one vote : the theory
Burkart, Mike, (2008)
- More ...