Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Irina Hasnas, Luca Lambertini, Arsen Palestini

We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	June 8, 2011
Authors:	Hasnas, Irina ; Lambertini, Luca ; Palestini, Arsen
Publisher:	Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics
Subject:	R&D \| spillovers \| dynamic games \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Spillover-Effekt \| Spillover effect \| Theorie \| Theory \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Open Innovation \| Open innovation \| Industrieforschung \| Industrial research \| Innovationsmanagement \| Innovation management \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Wissenstransfer \| Knowledge transfer

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten)
Series:	Quaderni - working paper DSE / Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics. - Bologna : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2282-6483, ZDB-ID 2125055-8. - Vol. no 753
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4487 [DOI] hdl:10419/159594 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737203