Opportunistic renegotiation of infrastructure concessions as rent seeking: the effect of legal systems Gabriel Garcia Morales
This paper examines the problem of renegotiation of infrastructure concessions in Latin America using a model of litigation with an application to incentive contracts. Opportunistic renegotiation is here defined as a rent seeking game, to show the effect of the legal system characteristics in the probability of renegotiation. A main conclusion is that legal systems where each party pays for their own legal expenses, such as the American, are more prone to opportunistic renegotiation. On the other hand, systems, such as the British, that concentrates legal expenses in one party might discourage opportunistic behavior by making it more costly.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Morales, Gabriel García |
Published in: |
REVISTA ECONOMÍA & REGIÓN. - UNIVERSIDAD TECNOLÓGICA DE BOLÍVAR. - 2011
|
Publisher: |
UNIVERSIDAD TECNOLÓGICA DE BOLÍVAR |
Subject: | Auctions | fee-shifting | incentives | litigation | public choice | rent seeking |
Saved in:
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