Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cukierman, Alex |
Other Persons: | Liviatan, Nissan (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of monetary economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3932, ZDB-ID 191155-7. - Vol. 27.1991, 1, p. 99-127
|
Subject: | Politiker | Politicians | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory |
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