Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sahm, Marco |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Tullock contest | heterogeneous valuations | accuracy | discrimination | optimal design | all-pay auction |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 9601 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1794813446 [GVK] hdl:10419/252118 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_9601 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
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Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Sahm, Marco, (2022)
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Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Sahm, Marco, (2022)
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