Optimal Allocation of Limited Funds in Quadratic Funding

We examine the allocation of a limited pool of matching funds to public good projects using Quadratic Funding. In particular, we consider a variation of the Capital Constrained Quadratic Funding (CQF) mechanism proposed by Buterin, Hitzig and Weyl (2019) where only funds in the matching pool are distributed among projects. We show that this mechanism achieves a socially optimal allocation of limited funds

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Pasquini, Ricardo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Investmentfonds \| Investment Fund \| Portfolio-Management \| Portfolio selection \| Allokation \| Allocation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 29, 2022 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4176411 [DOI]
Classification:	d47 ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079598