Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
Alexei Boulatov, Sergei Severinov
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Boulatov, Alexei ; Severinov, Sergei |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 127.2021, p. 155-178
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| Subject: | Asymmetric budget constraints | Auctions | Mechanism Design | Optimal and efficient mechanisms | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint | Auktion | Auction | Effizienz | Efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.001 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616788