Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Pereyra, Juan ; Silva, Francisco |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 2, p. 793-836
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Subject: | evidence | matching | mechanism design | Probabilistic verification |
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