Optimal auction design under non-commitment
Vasiliki Skreta (Department of Economics, University College London, United Kingdom)
| Year of publication: |
September 2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Skreta, Basilikē |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 159.2015, p. 854-890
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| Subject: | Mechanism design | Optimal auctions | Limited commitment | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.007 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549258