Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")

I consider optimal auctions for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers, organized in a `well-coordinated' cartel. I show that, even though the seller cannot deter collusion, he can optimally accommodate it by employing a simple mechanism which imposes an inefficient allocation on the bidders unless they pay a sufficiently high amount to avoid it.

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Year of publication:	2008-06-01
Authors:	Gruyer, Nicolas
Institutions:	Laboratoire d'Économie et Économétrie de l'Aérien (LEEA), École Nationale de l'Aviation Civile (ENAC)
Subject:	auctions \| optimal auctions \| collusion \| cartel \| mechanism design \| auction theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 21. Number 06 21 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635339