Optimal cartel trigger strategies and the number of firms
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Briggs, Hugh Cary |
Published in: |
Review of industrial organization : RIO. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 0889-938X, ZDB-ID 638140-6. - Vol. 11.1996, 4, p. 551-561
|
Subject: | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Theorie | Theory |
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