Optimal CEO turnover
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wang, Cheng ; Yang, Youzhi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 203.2022, p. 1-38
|
Subject: | CEO compensation and turnover | Limited commitment | Moral hazard | Optimal contracting | Outside option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Moral Hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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