Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications
Year of publication: |
2009-03
|
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Authors: | Flochel, Laurent ; Versaevel, Bruno ; de Villemeur, Étienne |
Institutions: | Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series IDEI Working Paper Number 547 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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