Optimal contracting under adverse selection: The implications of mentalizing
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Lenells, Jonatan ; Stea, Diego ; Foss, Nicolai J. |
Published in: |
Contemporary Economics. - Warsaw : Vizja Press & IT, ISSN 2084-0845. - Vol. 9.2015, 2, p. 215-231
|
Publisher: |
Warsaw : Vizja Press & IT |
Subject: | Adverse selection | mentalizing | hard information | soft information | contract |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.5709/ce.1897-9254.168 [DOI] 833202251 [GVK] hdl:10419/141906 [Handle] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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Optimal contracting under adverse selection : the implications of mentalizing
Lenells, Jonatan, (2015)
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Optimal contracting under adverse selection : the implications of mentalizing
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Optimal Contracting Under Adverse Selection : The Implications of Mentalizing
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