Optimal contracting with boundedly rational agents
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Königstein, Manfred |
Published in: |
Homo oeconomicus. - München : Accedo Verl.-Ges., ISSN 0943-0180, ZDB-ID 626351-3. - Vol. 18.2001, 2, p. 211-228
|
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality | Theorie | Theory |
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