Optimal contracts based on subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity
Year of publication: |
April 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sebald, Alexander ; Walzl, Markus |
Published in: |
Journal of economic psychology : research in economic psychology and behavioral economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-4870, ZDB-ID 865181-4. - Vol. 47.2015, p. 62-76
|
Subject: | Contracts | Subjective evaluations | Self-esteem | Ego-threats | Reciprocity | Experiment | Persönlichkeitspsychologie | Personality psychology | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics |
-
Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations
Sebald, Alexander, (2014)
-
Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles, (2018)
-
Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles, (2019)
- More ...
-
Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity
Sebald, Alexander, (2012)
-
Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations
Sebald, Alexander, (2012)
-
How ego-threats facilitate contracts based on subjective evaluations
Sebald, Alexander, (2008)
- More ...