Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Giebe, Thomas ; Gürtler, Oliver |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 81.2012, 2, p. 403-420
|
Subject: | Subjective performance evaluation | Leniency | Supervisor | Private information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Personalbeurteilung | Employee appraisal | Vertrag | Contract |
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