Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Monnet, Cyril ; Quintin, Erwan |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 26.2005, 4, p. 867-885
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Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Unternehmensfinanzierung | Corporate finance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Projektbewertung | Project evaluation | Theorie | Theory | Entscheidung unter Risiko | Decision under risk |
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