OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS <link rid="fn28">-super-* </link>
This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony. Copyright 2008 The Author. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | HARRINGTON, JOSEPH E. |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 56.2008, 2, p. 215-246
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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