Optimal design of intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Huber, Bernd ; Runkel, Marco |
Published in: |
International tax and public finance. - New York : Springer, ISSN 0927-5940, ZDB-ID 1207421-4. - Vol. 13.2006, 1, p. 25-41
|
Subject: | Finanzausgleich | Intergovernmental transfers | Finanzbeziehungen | Fiscal relations | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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