Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Page, Frank H. |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 3.1997, 1, p. 1-13
|
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Theorie | Theory |
-
Dealing with moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously
Dionne, Georges, (1985)
-
Anreizprobleme beim Transfer der Kreditrisiken aus Buchkrediten
Henke, Sabine, (2002)
-
Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information
Roger, Guillaume, (2013)
- More ...
-
Arbitrage, equilibrium and nonsatiation
Allouch, Nizar, (2002)
-
Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing
Page, Frank H., (2002)
-
Information sharing and bargaining in buyer-seller networks
Priazhkina, Sofia, (2016)
- More ...