Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Chen, Bo ; Chen, Bo |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1090-2473, ZDB-ID 1467668-0. - Vol. 143.2024, p. 204-222
|
Subject: | All-pay auction | Bayesian persuasion | Contest | Information disclosure | Interdependent valuations | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unternehmensbewertung | Firm valuation |
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