Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
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Authors: | Piskorski, Tomasz ; Westerfield, Mark M. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 166.2016, p. 242-281
|
Subject: | Monitoring | Dynamic contracts | Managerial compensation | Moral hazard | Endogenous financing constraints | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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