Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
Tomasz Piskorski, Mark M. Westerfield
| Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Piskorski, Tomasz ; Westerfield, Mark M. |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 166.2016, p. 242-281
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| Subject: | Monitoring | Dynamic contracts | Managerial compensation | Moral hazard | Endogenous financing constraints | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011650377