Optimal Effort Allocation by U.S. Senators: The Role of Constituency Size.
Legislators in a representative democracy are modeled as being able to allocate a fixed amount of effort between two objectives: national policymaking and local benefit-seeking. The model predicts that the effort allocated to local benefit-seeking should be a negative function of the population size of a legislator's constituency. The authors empirically test and confirm this prediction by examining the manner in which U.S. senators allocate their personal staff between home state and Washington D.C. offices. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Atlas, Cary M ; Hendershott, Robert J ; Zupan, Mark A |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 92.1997, 3-4, p. 221-29
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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