Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Sheriff, Glenn |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 55.2008, 1, p. 72-89
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Subject: | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Umweltstandard | Environmental standard | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Subvention | Subsidy | Internalisierung externer Effekte | Internalizing externalities | Theorie | Theory |
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