Optimal Fees in Internet Auctions

An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

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Year of publication:	2008-01
Authors:	Matros, Alexander ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Institutions:	Kyiv School of Economics
Subject:	Internet auctions \| auctions with resale \| auction house \| listing fee \| closing fee

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Review of Economic Design, 12, 155-163 (2008) Number 3
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464582