Optimal firms' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality

Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini

We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.

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Year of publication:	July 9, 2014
Authors:	Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca
Publisher:	Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics
Subject:	mixed oligopoly \| pollution \| resource extraction \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Umweltbelastung \| Pollution \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Umweltpolitik \| Environmental policy \| Öffentliches Unternehmen \| Public enterprise

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Quaderni - working paper DSE / Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics. - Bologna : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2282-6483, ZDB-ID 2125055-8. - Vol. no 955
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4048 [DOI] hdl:10419/159794 [Handle]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; P13 - Cooperative Enterprises ; Q50 - Environmental Economics. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729094