Optimal incentive contracting with ex ante and ex post moral hazards : theory and evidence
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Puelz, Robert |
Other Persons: | Snow, Arthur (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of risk and uncertainty : JRU. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 0895-5646, ZDB-ID 59837-9. - Vol. 14.1997, 2, p. 169-188
|
Subject: | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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