Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Dur, Robert ; Glazer, Amihai |
Institutions: | CESifo |
Subject: | principal-agent | envy | moral hazard | compensation | incentives | contracts | profit-sharing | stock options | public vs. private production |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 1282 |
Classification: | J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J., (2006)
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Dur, Robert A. J., (2004)
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert, (2004)
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How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy
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