Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Year of publication: |
2010-07
|
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Authors: | Englmaier, Florian ; Muehlheusser, Gerd ; Roider, Andreas |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | moral hazard | limited commitment | ex-post outside option | limited liability |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K31 - Labor Law ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian, (2010)
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian, (2010)
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