Optimal incentive schemes when only the agents "best" output matters to the principal
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Levitt, Steven D. |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 26.1995, 4, p. 744-760
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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